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POINT I 
NEITHER THIS COURT NOR THE LOWEi COURT MAY 
SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THE|JUDGMENT 
OF THE CLEARFIELD CITY COUNCIL. 
Respondent in its Brief agrees with that portion of the 
standard of review that a court cannot substitute its judgment 
for that of the legislative body of the municipality. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 9). However, Respondent then states that 
because this action is "equitable" the normal appellate standard 
of review in equitable cases must be applied. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 10-11). This latter statement is incorrect. 
While it is true that in the instant pase certain equitable 
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procedures were utilized in order to enforce the judgment of the 
court this does not make the lower court's decision a strictly 
equitable case as now contended by Respondent. Essentially, the 
lower court is not empowered to try the zoning matter as a trial 
de novo but is reviewing the decision of the city governing 
body on the basis of arbitrary and capricious action. Thus, this 
type of proceeding is in the nature of an appeal rather than an 
original equitable proceeding. 
In the cases cited by Respondent the lower court was the 
original trier of fact and was therefore vested with a great deal 
of discretion and a presumption of validity also vested with the 
trial judge. In the instant case, however, the original decision 
maker was the Clearfield City Council and the same presumption of 
validity must be given to that body. 
In Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 
P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) a property owner appealed the decision of 
the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment denying his requested 
variance for a lot on which he had built a duplex. A Third 
District Court Judge ordered the Board to grant the variance and 
the City appealed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court judgment and ordered the City decision to be reinstated. 
The Court noted that while a lower court is free to take 
evidence in a matter involving zoning questions "this does not 
mean that the hearing in the District Court should be a retrial 
on the merits, or that the District Court can substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board." Id. at 1034. 
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In reversing the lower court decision the Supreme Court 
noted that the trial judge had improperly viewed his role in the 
proceeding. The Court stated: 
In the case at hand, the Distri 
to weigh anew the underlying factual 
ct Judge undertook 
considerations. 
While there may have been some evidence in the record 
to support the trial judge's finding 
prerogative to weigh the evidence an| 
limited to determining whether there 
the record to support the Board of Adjustment's 
action. 
s, it was not his 
lew. His role was 
was evidence in 
The judge made it clear that he thought retention 
of low-cost housing, regardless of zoning 
considerations, should be the overriding policy in 
Salt Lake City. However, it does nop matter whether 
the judge agrees or disagrees with the rationale of 
the Board or the policy grounds upon which a decision 
is based. It does not lie within the prerogative of 
the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the Board where the record discloses a reasonable 
basis for the Board's decision. Id. at 1035. 
Other courts in numerous states support the position that 
this Court is not bound in any manner by the findings of the 
lower court and must view the evidence submitted at the Council 
hearing or supplemented in the lower courtq proceeding to 
determine the actions of the governing bodly and not the actions 
of the lower court. The Arizona Supreme C burt has held that the 
rule stating that a trial court will be upheld if there is 
evidence in support of the judgment is not applicable in zoning 
cases. In addition, the trial court's conclusions as to the 
validity of zoning ordinances are not binding upon the appellate 
court if the record on appeal shows the question was debatable. 
City of Phoenix v. Oglescy, 537 P.2d 934 (Ariz. 1975). 
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See also, City of Phoenix v. Price, 500 P.2d 1132 (Ariz. 
App. 1972) (trial court's findings and conclusions as to 
reasonableness of zoning ordinances were not binding on Court of 
Appeals if record showed question was "debatable"). 
The Supreme Court of Kansas has stated that the question 
whether an action of the zoning body was reasonable or not is one 
of law and not of fact and thus the Supreme Court in reviewing 
the trial court's decision must make the same review of a zoning 
authority's action as does the trial court. Neither court is 
free to make findings of fact independent of those explicitly or 
implicitly found by the city governing body. The court is 
limited to determining whether the facts could reasonably have 
been found by the zoning body to justify its decision. 
Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978). 
Likewise, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that in 
determining whether a city's decision not to rezone is 
unreasonable the Supreme Court must look beyond the findings and 
conclusions of the trial court and consider the basic physical 
facts appearing in the record to ascertain the reasonableness of 
the city's actions and whether they are fairly debatable. 
Garrett v. City of Oklahoma City, 594 P.2d 764 (Okla. 
1972). 
Respondent seems to imply that the lower court's function 
was that of a trier of fact to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. (Respondent's Brief, p. 11). Respondent argues that 
the lower court by viewing the witnesses personally could have 
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determined the "real reasons" why the pezfmit was not granted. 
Essentially, therefore, Respondent is stating that a lower court 
actors given by a city 
must also view the 
judge must not only examine the various f| 
council for denying a zoning request but 
evidence in order to determine which of t|he factors were the 
"real" reason a request has been denied. 
Such an argument misses the standard of review in these* type 
of cases. A councilman, for example, may have five reasons for 
voting against a proposed zoning change. It is not necessary for 
the city to prove that each of these reasons in and of themselves 
is reasonable for the denial of the request. Rather, it is only 
necessary to show that at least one of thf reasons is sufficient 
to justify the actions of the city body. It is only when there 
is no rational basis based upon any claimed reasoning that a 
court can reverse the decision of a governing body and require 
the city to take contrary action. 
For this reason, therefore, the equitlable standard argued by 
Respondent in its Brief is inapplicable to 
not be applied to any of the substantive a 
follow. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE CLEARFIELD C±TY COUNCIL 
this case and should 
Irguments which will now 
COMMISSION 
TO THE 
AND THE CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING 
TO DENY A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
PLAINTIFF WAS BASED UPON RATIONAL REASONING 
AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS 
Respondent in its Brief argues that the various reasons 
stated throughout the City proceedings are invalid for the denial 
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of a permit and that the lower court was therefore correct in 
concluding that the City action was arbitrary and capricious. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-18). Respondent has chosen to select 
statements made by various City council members during the 
numerous hours of testimony and to base its argument on these 
isolated statements. Again, as noted in Appellants' opening 
brief, it is not necessary for Appellant to justify every reason 
given during the City proceedings by every member of the 
governing body. The burden is simply to show that the decision 
was based upon some rational basis as was presented to that 
body. 
For example, Respondent cites the case of Horbal v. City 
of Ham Lake. (Respondent's Brief, p. 13). The court in that 
case carefully went through all of the reasons listed by the city 
council in rejecting the permit and concluded that none of the 
reasons were valid. 
Respondent has failed to even acknowledge the existence of 
the Addiction Recovery Center which had previously been 
constructed at the site. Respondent has failed to address the 
contention made by several members of the council that it would 
be against the community interest to place two of these type of 
facilities adjacent to each other rather than creating a distance 
between them. Respondent has failed to address the cases cited 
by Appellants upholding the separation of facilities as a valid 
reason for rejecting a permit. (Appellants' opening brief, pp. 
37-38). 
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Appellants relied upon the case of si ullivan v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1988 (D. Pa. 1985) in its opening 
brief. (Appellants' Brief, p. 37). Respondent has cited the 
same case in its Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p. 20). The court 
in that case, while requiring that a facility be allowed to be 
put into the city did so since it was not within a close 
proximity to existing facilities. The court stated: 
To the extent that the number of group homes in 
the City of Pittsburgh is a legitimate concern, 
defendant legislated this concern by prohibiting the 
location of a group residence facility within one-half 
mile of another group residence, a group care 
facility, an institutional facility or an out-patient 
drug and alcohol clinic, and by prohibiting the 
location of a group care facility within one-quarter 
mile of such facilities or clinics. ARC's 
applications are not inconsistent wit[h this legitimate 
requirement. Id. at 1498. 
Thus, while some of the statements mdde by the various 
council members concerning their individual reasons for rejecting 
the application may or may not be proper, the record as 
established during the City Council meeting shows that one of the 
facility next to the 
b opening brief, this 
t required to place two 
primary concerns was the proximity of this 
existing one. As stated previously, in the 
concern was legitimate and the City was not 
of these types of facilities next to each other any more than it 
would have been required to place two or three banks next to each 
other since clustering clearly impacts on the surrounding area. 
To require such adjacent placement effectively would eliminate 
the purpose of a conditional use permit and would convert the 
zoning into a permitted use zone. 
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Respondent also argues that if the decision of the lower 
court is reversed, "the future of the mental health delivery 
system is dramatically jeopardized since its continuing 
effectiveness is contingent upon successful integration into the 
neighborhood setting." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 16-17). 
As was noted in Appellants' opening brief the Utah State 
Legislature has specifically enacted a statute for the purpose of 
protecting handicapped persons and in requiring cities to 
establish areas for facilities to house them. §10-9-2.5 U.C.A. 
However, the Legislature specifically excluded under the 
definition of handicapped persons people who were being treated 
for alcoholism or drug abuse. These are the exact type of people 
which Davis County is proposing to place in the new facility. 
While Respondent characterizes the residents as "mentally ill" 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 16) it is more correct to define these 
individuals as recovering from alcohol and drug dependency 
problems together with any other mental health problems they may 
have suffered as a result of their addictions. 
It would seem, therefore, that if alcohol and drug addicts 
are to receive special consideration in zoning ordinances enacted 
by municipalities that such consideration should be directed to 
the State Legislature and not to this Court. If the policy 
reasons for establishing these facilities is equal to or even 
greater than the reasons for establishing handicap facilities 
then the State Legislature should pass a similar law. Again, 
however, it should be kept in mind as observed in Appellants' 
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opening brief, that even the present statute relating to 
handicapped individuals allows for a distance of one mile between 
existing facilities. 
Respondent asks the Court to examind the case of 
Northwest Residence, Inc. v. The City ofi Brooklyn Center, 
352 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. App. 1984). (Respondent's Brief, p. 17). 
It is appropriate to note that in that case the Court of Appeals 
for Minnesota once again stated that "a reviewing court must make 
an independent examination of a city council decision without a 
according any special deference to the same review conducted by 
the trial court." Id. at 767. This statement is in accordance 
with the standard of review previously noted by Appellants. 
In addition, the Northwest Residence 
that municipalities 
special use permit for mentally ill adults. The court found that 
the legislature had specifically enacted Statutes for the 
protection of this type of individual and 
could not circumvent this state law by lodal ordinances. Id. 
at 772*773. Again, this type of state statutory enactment is not 
present here. 
case involved a 
concerns of many people 
|arings it is not 
validate each and 
While admittedly there were numerous 
during the City Council and City zoning he 
critical for the purpose of this appeal to 
every reason expressed by each individual. Rather, the question 
is simply whether there was enough evidence to support a rational 
basis for the the decision of the City Council. 
Appellants do not dispute that the argument raised 
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by the County concerning the need of this facility is valid or 
that many of the concerns expressed by some members of the 
Council and the audience were irrelevant to the issue. On the 
other hand, as long as the question of granting the permit was 
"fairly debatable" [Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528 
(Ariz. App. 1985)] then this Court must affirm the 
municipality's decision since it cannot substitute its own 
judgment for that of the elected city representatives. The lower 
court was, therefore, in error in reversing the decision of this 
governmental body when there was substantial reason existing to 
support the decision, 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
CLEARFIELD CITY HAD ACTED IN AN UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL MANNER. 
Appellants in their opening brief contended that the 
District Court erred in concluding that the Council and Planning 
Commission had acted unconstitutionally in the application of the 
ordinance. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 41-45). Respondent contends 
that the City in fact did apply the ordinances in an 
unconstitutional manner. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-21). 
Respondent has cited three cases in support of its position: City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center; J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 
Washington; and Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh. 
The Cleburne Living Center case and the J.W. case were 
addressed initially in Appellants' Brief. Both of these cases 
involved ordinances which had been enacted for the purpose of 
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requiring special conditions to be made by persons who were 
mentally retarded or were former mental patients. The courts in 
Cleburne and J.W. found there was no rational basis for enacting 
these ordinances as directed at these groups of individuals- In 
the instant case, of course, there is no similar ordinance in 
that the ordinance relied upon by the County pertains to all 
restaurants, etc. 
on that a city may in 
rtain groups of 
for making that 
facilities including group homes, banks, 
These cases, stand for the propositilc 
fact enact ordinances directed towards ce|i 
individuals if there is a rational basis 
distinction. As noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
the J.W. case: 
Other groups of persons burdened by the Tacoma 
ordinance, such as parolees, may be situated 
significantly differently. Although the record before 
us in this case does not address the issue, it is 
conceivable that community fears concerning such 
groups may rest on a sound factual basis. . . . Each 
group must, of course, be considered[in light of its 
own peculiar circumstances. 720 F.2q 1126, 1129 fn. 
2. 
The U. S. Supreme Court in Cleburne focused its attention 
on the "feeble minded" but did not state tjhat the community was 
not empowered to regulate other groups of 
alcoholic or drug addicts or penal or corrk 
In addition, neither Cleburne nor J.Wj. 
individuals such as 
ectional inmates. 
. involved an 
application to place two facilities together such as in the 
instant case. In addition, both Cleburne bnd J.W. involved 
classes of people who were protected by various federal and state 
statutes whereas the present classification of recoverying 
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alcoholics and drug addicts have not received such treatment. 
Thus, the Cleburne decision and J.W. decision have no 
application to the facts of this case. 
In Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh the court enjoined 
the city from declaring a moratorium which would prohibit the 
establishment of group homes for recovering alcoholics. The 
court there concluded that as long as permits were being issued 
to other groups throughout the city that a discrimination had 
occurred by singling out this particular group. As noted 
earlier, however, the court stated that it was a legitimate 
concern for the city to require spacing between facilities. 
Unlike Sullivan there has been no moratorium enacted in 
Clearfield City against the establishment of these type of 
facilities. To the contrary, the new revised ordinances now 
allow these facilities to be placed virtually anywhere in the 
community. There has been no denial of these type of homes as a 
group but only as to the specific site requested by the County. 
Thus, the Sullivan case is also not germane to this appeal. 
As noted in the earlier section there is a rational basis 
for denying this permit solely because of the proximity to the 
existing treatment center. This reason not only eliminates a 
claim of arbitrariness and capriciousness but also satisfies all 
consititutional requirements. The lower court was therefore 
incorrect in concluding that the statute had been applied in an 
unconstitutional manner. 
CONCLUSION 
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a body of individuals 
Id City. It is the 
councils to hear the 
izens and other 
This is not an equity case in which the findings of the 
lower court should be affirmed in the absence of manifest error. 
Rather, this is a case in which the lower court acting as a court 
of appeals struck down a decision made by 
duly elected by the residents of Clearfi^] 
purpose of planning commissions and city 
various concerns and interests of the cit|: 
individuals in making zoning decisions. 
As the Utah Supreme Court and numerous other courts have 
observed, it is the very function and expertise of these type of 
organizations that require deference to their decision unless 
they were made with no rational basis and were made in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner. The lower court in this case 
while acknowledging the standard of revie^ essentially concluded 
that it was more important to establish a 
site than it was to allow the City to require this facility to be 
built at another location. 
As noted earlier there is a legitimate debate between 
community planners as to whether it is best to concentrate these 
type of facilities in one area or spread them throughout the 
city. There are valid reasons to support both positions. It is 
the fact that this issue is "debatable" that is the relevant 
focus of the appeal rather than whetner one position is more 
correct than the other. The lower court instead of becoming a 
reviewer of the decision making process stepped into the shoes of 
the decision maker. The court erred in concluding that the 
second facility at this 
-13-
decision of the Council and Commission was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Finally, the Court erred in concluding that the statutes had 
been unconstitutionally applied. There is no statute in this 
case similar to those cases relied upon by Respondent nor is 
there any policy of Clearfield City to exclude these facilities 
from all parts of the city. It is certainly a legitimate 
function of the government to decide where these types of 
facilities should be located unless there is a contrary mandate 
from the state or federal government overriding this authority. 
The lower court was therefore incorrect in holding an 
unconstitutional application. 
For these reasons, therefore, the decision of the lower 
court should be reversed and the decision of the Council should 
be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of June, 1987. 
Jraig S ^ /Cook 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appellants 
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